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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
A former party to this litigation, Dr. Richard Allen, D.P.M. ("Dr. Allen") is a 
podiatrist who owns and operates an independent podiatry practice. Dr. Allen treated a 
patient named Harvey Wainio on three occasions in January of 2010. The first two visits 
took place in Dr. Allen's private office. During his first visit with Dr. Allen, Mr. Wainio 
(now deceased) complained of a painful bunion and hammertoes. The pain had reduced 
him to wearing house slippers rather than shoes and limited his activity, as he was unable 
to stand or walk for lengths of time. 
After performing a physical examination and evaluating x-rays Dr. Allen 
recommended surgery. Mr. Wainio asked that the surgery take place as soon as possible. 
A pre-operative visit took place on January 18, 2010. Dr. Allen's physical examination of 
Mr. Wainio revealed strong pulses in the lower extremities. Surgery took place on January 
21, 2010 at Syringa Surgical Center ("Syringa"). After the procedure Mr. Wainio 
experienced inadequate blood flow to his right foot. His foot became necrotic, and 
ultimately, he underwent a below the knee amputation of his right leg. Two-and-a-half 
years later, I'v1r. Wainio passed away. The Appellants contended that Mr. Wainio's demise 
was related to the January 21, 20 IO procedure. 
The Appellants claimed that Dr. Allen should not have performed the January 21, 
2010 surgery on Mr. Wainio, because he (Wanio) lacked adequate blood perfusion to his 
right foot. The Appellants' position was directly contradicted by Dr. Allen's chart notes 
and sworn deposition testimony, in which he confirmed the existence of adequate pedal 
pulses. Finding themselves unable to contradict Dr. Allen's subjective findings of adequate 
perfusion - supported by Dr. Allen's contemporaneous chart notes and sworn testimony 
the Appellants pursued the theory that Dr. Allen did not or could not have palpated pulses. 
In an effort to support their argument, the Appellants attempted to capitalize on the 
fact that Dr. Allen had undergone inpatient treatment for drug abuse. Dr. Allen had 
successfully completed a 60-day inpatient drug treatment program several months prior to 
his first encounter with Mr. Wainio. The Appellants conducted far-reaching discovery into 
the nature and extent of Dr. Allen's abuse of controlled substances. Ultimately, however, 
the Appellants could not uncover any evidence that Dr. Allen's addiction continued after 
his inpatient treatment was successfully completed. Undeterred, the Appellants hired an 
anesthesiologist, Dr. Paul Wischmeyer, M.D. as an expert witness. Dr. Wischmeyer 
contended that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that Dr. Allen "could" have relapsed, 
which "would have'' impaired his ability to perceive Mr. Wainio's pulses. Dr. Wischmeyer 
offered several speculative affidavits concerning Dr. Allen's alleged relapse. Dr. Allen and 
several of his fellow employees conclusively testified that such a relapse did not occur. The 
trial court excluded the evidence under IRE 402-403 and 702. 
The Appellants did not initially contend that Syringa was independently negligent. 
Rather, the Appellants contended that Dr. Allen was an actual or apparent agent of Syringa, 
and thus, pursued Syringa under respondeat superior liability. However, the uncontroverted 
record before the trial court showed that Dr. Allen was not an employee of Syringa, and 
that he did not hold himself out as an agent of Syringa. Both of the pre-operative visits 
during which Dr. Allen was allegedly negligent occurred at Dr. Allen's private office. Mr. 
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Wainio, for his part, had never heard of "Syringa" and at all times believed that he was 
being treated by Dr. Allen. Indeed, he was referred specifically by a physician to Dr. Allen 
by name. The Appellants pointed to Dr. Allen's privileges to perform surgery at Syringa 
and ownership stake in Syringa as evidence of agency. The trial court found that the 
Appellants failed to satisfy their burden of proof against Syringa under IRCP 56, and 
dismissed the claims against Syringa. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
Appellants Harvey Wainio and Beatrice Shatto (the wife of Mr. Wainio) filed suit 
on March 9, 2011 against Syringa Surgical Center, LLC and Dr. Richard M. Allen, D.P.M. 
R. Vol. I, p. 48-54. The Appellants contended that Dr. Allen failed to comply with the 
applicable standard of care for a podiatrist, which led to the loss of Mr. Wainio's lower 
right leg. Id. at p. 51-52. The Appellants further contended that Dr. Allen's violation of the 
standard of care occurred "as an agent, employee and/or servant of Syringa Surgical 
Center." Id. at 51, paragraph 3.2. 
In January of 2013, the Appellants were granted leave of court to amend their 
Complaint to assert a wrongful death claim against the defendants, to add Jennifer Viveros 
(daughter of Harvey Wainio) as a plaintiff, and to substitute the Estate of Harvey Wainio 
for Harvey Wainio as a plaintiff. R. Vol. I, p. 460-468. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint 
was filed on January 15, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 497-504. In their First Amended Complaint, 
the Appellants contended that Syringa had a duty to monitor its ·'agents," including Dr. 
Allen, to ensure that he was not impaired. R. Vol. I, p. 500. Further, Appellants alleged 
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that Syringa had a duty to monitor its drug inventory to assure that its drugs "were not 
being improperly misused by its agents, employees or physicians." Id. 
On January 23, 2014, Dr. Allen filed a Motion in Li mine to Exclude All Evidence 
of Drug Use or Abuse. R. Vol. I, p. 1365-1388. Dr. Allen argued: (1) there was no evidence 
that Dr. Allen was using drugs or impaired when he was treating for or operating on Mr. 
Wainio (i.e., the evidence was not relevant), (2) any slight probative value of the drug abuse 
evidence was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such testimony, (3) 
plaintiffs' expert Dr. Paul Wischmeyer's opinions concerning Dr. Allen's drug use were 
inadmissible speculation under IRE 702, and ( 4) the "failure to monitor" or "failure to 
safeguard" arguments against Syringa were likewise inadmissible for reasons (l)-(3), 
supra. Id. Syringajoined Dr. Allen's Motion and filed its own briefing on the issues raised 
therein. R. Vol. I, p. 1561-1574. Syringa further argued that Dr. Wischmeyer's untimely 
opinions violated the rules of discovery and the expert witness disclosure deadlines set by 
the trial court in accordance vvith IRCP 26(b )( 4). Id. at 1568. 
The Appellants submitted two Affidavits from Dr. Wischmeyer in opposition to Dr. 
Allen and Syringa' s Motion. The first, dated October 19, 2012 contended that there was "a 
reasonable likelihood that Dr. Allen could have relapsed in use of either opiates or 
Propofol, which would of impaired his perception and/or ability to appropriately care for 
and evaluate Mr. Wainio." R. Vol. I, p. 1157-1558 (emphasis added). The Appellants also 
submitted an Affidavit from Ms. Shatto dated January 28, 2014 in which she claimed to 
have "attended the pre-surgical visit with Dr. Allen," during which she observed "jerky 
movements" by Dr. Allen, and "glittery eyes." R. Vol. I, p. 1682 ( emphasis added). Ms. 
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Shatto had previously testified that she did not attend or did not recall the January 18, 2010 
visit, as she was busy that day. R. Vol. I, p. 1919. 
Dr. Wischmeyer submitted another Affidavit dated February 3, 2014, in which he 
testified that Ms. Shatto's Affidavit describing "glittery eyes" and '·jerky movements" 
along with Dr. Allen's previous drug abuse and family history demonstrated that Dr. Allen 
"relapsed and was under the influence of drugs at the time of his preoperative evaluation 
of Mr. Wainio on January 18, 2010." R. Vol. I, p. 1711. However, Dr. Wischmeyer's 
Affidavit was factually incorrect on its face. Ms. Shatto did not attend the January 18,2010 
pre-surgical visit. R. Vol., I, p. 2257. While Ms. Shatto's Affidavit claimed that she 
attended '·the'' pre-surgical visit, she testified in her deposition that the only time she was 
in the presence of Dr. Allen was on the January 4, 2010 visit. Id. at p. 2257, FN 2. Dr. 
Wischmeyer' s Affidavit made no mention of intoxication, relapse, or impairment on either 
January 4, 2010 or January 21, 2010. 
On February 19, 2014, the court issued an "Opinion and Order on Pretrial Motions," 
which addressed the drug use/abuse issue. R. Vol. I, p. 2254-2259. The trial court granted 
Dr. Allen's and Syringa's Motion in Limine. Id. In doing so, the trial court concluded that 
Dr. Wischmeyer's opinions amounted to speculation and conjecture, lacking sufficient 
foundation. R. Vol. I, p. 2257-2258. Next, the trial court found that even if Dr. 
Wischmeyer· s opinions were relevant, any such probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and 
the potential for undue delay. Id. 
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On September 10, 2014, Defendant Syringa filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
contending that Syringa should be dismissed because no act or omission of Dr. Allen was 
performed as an actual or apparent agent of Syringa. R. Vol. I, p. 2646-2658. The 
Appellants responded by arguing that a question of fact existed as to whether Dr. Allen 
acted as an agent of Syringa when he was allegedly negligent, and second, Syringa was 
negligent in connection with Dr. Allen's alleged drug use. 
The trial court granted Syringa's Motion for Summary Judgment, finding as 
follows: 
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs' allegation is that Dr. Allen was 
negligent in claiming he felt a pedal pulse in Wainio's right foot, 
as Wainio's circulation was too occluded for a pedal pulse to have 
been detected, and that as a result of Dr. Allen's negligence, he 
determined Wainio had sufficient blood flow for post-surgical 
healing to occur, when in fact there was insufficient blood flow. 
Under the facts in the record, Plaintiffs have alleged no negligent 
conduct by Dr. Allen at any time on the day of, or during, the 
surgical procedure itself. Nor have they alleged any negligence by 
any Syringa employee or independent contractor providing 
services for Syringa. In order for Syringa to be vicariously liable 
for Dr. Allen's alleged act of negligence, which occurred in the 
office of his private practice during a pre-surgery exam, there 
would have to be a principal/agent relationship between Syringa 
and Dr. Allen relative to Allen's private medical practice. The 
record is void of any facts that any such agency - express, implied, 
or apparent was created between Dr. Allen and Syringa relative 
to Dr. Allen's private medical practice. 
R. Vol. L p. 3040-3041. 
Finally, on October 27, 2014, despite the trial court's prior order excluding such 
evidence, Appellants filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence of Dr. Allen's 
drug use. R. Vol. I, p. 2728. The trial court denied the Appellants' motion on November 
19, 2014. R. Vol. I, 3030-3035. 
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The claims brought against Dr. Allen were settled prior to trial and the claims 
against him were dismissed. R. Vol. I, p. 3117-3118. The claims belonging to Ms. Viveros 
expired upon her death. Id. at 3. Judgment was entered in Syringa's favor on January 30, 
2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 3120. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Formation of Syringa and Treatment of Mr. Wainio. 
Syringa Surgical Center, LLC was formed in 2004 by Steven Ozeran, M.D. and 
Richard Allen. D.P.M. R. Vol. I, p. 2683-2684. Dr. Ozeran, a plastic surgeon, and Dr. 
Allen, a podiatrist retained their independent practices. Id. Beginning in 2009, a third owner 
joined Dr. Ozeran and Dr. Allen, making each a one-third owner of Syringa. R. Vol. I, p. 
2687, 2697. The surgical center is used by other podiatrists, plastic surgeons and oral 
surgeons. ld. Syringa is an ambulatory surgical center ( or "day surgery" center). R. Vol. I, 
p. 2691-2692. Only outpatient procedures are performed at Syringa. R. Vol I, p. 2696. Dr. 
Allen is not an employee of Syringa. R. Vol. I, p. 2708. Dr. Allen had privileges to perform 
outpatient procedures at Syringa. R. Vol. I., p. 2871. 
Mr. Wainio was referred to Dr. Allen by Dr. Sigler to "fix [his] toes so [he] could 
walk better." R. Vol. L p. 2679. Prior to his first visit with Dr. Allen, Mr. Wainio had never 
heard of Syringa Surgical Center. had never been there, and did not "choose to see Dr. 
Allen in any way. shape or form because of his relationship to Syringa Surgical Center." 
R. Vol. I, p. 2651, 2903. 
Mr. Wainio's first visit with Dr. Allen was on January 4, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 2674. 
The January 4. 2010 visit took place at Dr. Allen's private office. R. Vol. L p. 499 at 2.4. 
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Mr. Wainio's second visit with Dr. Allen- likewise at Dr. Allen's private office occurred 
on January 18, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 2651, 2674, 2695. On January 21, 2010, after two pre-
operative visits, Dr. Allen performed surgery to treat a bunion on Mr. Wainio's right foot. 
R. Vol. I., p. 2416. The procedure was performed at Syringa Surgical Center. R. Vol. I, p. 
2279. 
The parties generally agree that prior to performing such procedures, a podiatrist 
should confirm that blood perfusion to the lower extremities exists. Dr. Allen contends that 
during a pre-operative examination of Mr. Wainio, he (Dr. Allen) verified the existence of 
adequate pedal pulses by palpation. R. Vol. I, p. 2004. 
After the procedure, Mr. Wainio had or developed inadequate blood flow to his 
right foot. Vol. L p. 2279. His foot became necrotic, and ultimately, he underwent a below 
the knee amputation of his right leg. R. Vol. I., p. 2279. Some two-and-a-half years after 
the procedure, during the course oflitigation, Mr. Wainio passed away. R. Vol. I., p. 2279. 
The Appellants contend that Mr. Wainio' s demise was put into motion by the January 21, 
2010 procedure. Id 
2. Dr. Allen's Drug Use and Treatment. 
Beginning in February or March of 2009, Dr. Allen became addicted to Propofol. 
R. Vol. I, p. 1405 at 2. Dr. Allen testified that he last took Propofol in August of 2009. R. 
Vol. I, p. 1405. On September 11, 2009, Dr. Allen admitted himself to inpatient treatment 
at Hazelden treatment facility in Newberg, Oregon. Id. at 4. He successfully completed 
treatment on November 17, 2009. Id. at 4 and p. 1418. The medical director of the facility 
recommended that Dr. Allen resume normal working duties on November 30, 2009. R. 
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Vol. I, p. l 418. Dr. Allen has not used Propofol since that time, and did not suffer from 
any impairment or lingering effects from his Propofol use since that time. R. Vol. L p. 1405 
at 5. 
Once Dr. Allen completed rehabilitation in November of 2009, he voluntarily 
initiated regular meetings with a substance abuse counselor, Diana Pals. R. Vol. I, p. 1421 
at 2, 4. Ms. Pals has over thirty (30) years of experience in substance abuse counseling. Id. 
at 3. Dr. Allen voluntarily agreed to counseling, to undergo random drug testing, and 
participated in both spiritual and self-help groups. R. Vol. I, p. 1421-1422 at 5. Dr. Allen 
underwent 63 random drug tests between December 10, 2009 and August 7, 2012, all of 
which were determined to be negative. R. Vol. I, p. 3034 at FN 2; 887-949. 
Percipient witnesses to Dr. Allen's prior drug use uniformly testified that there was 
absolutely no evidence of a relapse by Dr. Allen: 
• Richard Snyder, the Director of Surgical Services for Syringa testified that Since 
September of 2009, he had no concerns about Dr. Allen abusing drugs. R. Vol. I, 
p. 1369. Mr. Snyder implemented corrective measures in the surgical center, 
including a double-lock system and daily drug counts which never showed a 
discrepancy. Id. He attended most surgeries at Syringa and never saw Dr. Allen in 
an impaired state. Id. Mr. Snyder was present on the date of Mr. Wainio's surgery 
and noticed no sign of impairment. Id. 
• Monica Broerneling was an assistant at Dr. Allen's office, including in 2010. Id. 
She \vorked right alongside Dr. Allen and had no suspicion or concern that Dr. 
Allen had relapsed or had begun using drugs. Id. 
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• Heidi Pritchett, an office medical assistant who worked in Dr. Allen's office never 
saw Dr. Allen in a state which suggested he could not take care of a patient. Id. 
• Sherri Allen, Dr. Allen's wife and office manager testified that after Dr. Allen 
returned from Hazelden, she has had no concerns that he was using drugs and was 
confident that he was not using drugs anymore. Id. at 1370. 
In September of 2010, Dr. Allen entered into a Stipulation and Consent Order before the 
Board of Podiatry, State ofidaho. R. Vol. I, p. 1405 at 3. The Consent Order required drug 
counseling, urine drug screening, physician recovery group meetings, 12-step meetings, 
and meetings with an addiction sponsor. Id. In 2013, the Idaho Board of Podiatry ended 
Dr. Allen's three year term of probation early based upon the recommendation of Dr. 
Allen's treatment providers. R. Vol. I, p. 1438-1439. 
II. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES 
A. The Trial Judge Correctly Granted Syringa's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Appellants contend that summary judgment in Syringa's favor was inappropriate 
for three reasons: (1) the trial court failed to appreciate the scope of Appellants' negligence 
allegations, (2) any negligence by Dr. Allen should be attributed to Syringa under a theory 
of actual or (3) apparent authority, and ( 4) Syringa was negligent in its "complicity" with 
Dr. Allen's drug use. Appellant's [sic] Opening Brief ("Opening Brief'), pgs. 15-27. 
The trial court correctly identified the factual and legal deficiencies in Wainio's 
claims. Appellants failed to provide admissible evidence establishing the standard of care 
Syringa was obliged to follow, a violation of that standard, and any injury or damage 
10 
proximately caused by the same. Instead, Appellants exclusively relied upon their flawed 
allegations of negligence against Dr. Allen under a respondeat superior theory of liability. 
1. The Trial Court Fairly Construed Wainio's Negligence Claims. 
Appellants contend the trial court misinterpreted their allegations against Dr. Allen 
and/or Syringa, which resulted in an erroneous summary judgment ruling. Specifically, 
they argue that the trial court failed to appreciate their allegation that Dr. Allen was 
negligent on the day of the surgery, January 21, 2010. Opening Brief, p. 15. Appellants' 
argument is a red herring. They claim that Dr. Allen was not only negligent during the pre-
operative visits (January 4 and 18 2010) during which he determined that Wainio was a 
surgical candidate, but also on the date of the surgery, because "it was negligent to do the 
surgery at Syringa Surgical Center because he was not a surgical candidate." Opening 
Brief, p. 17. This is precisely the same negligence as alleged on January 4 and 18 2010. 
That is, the contention that "Mr. Wainio did not have the requisite pulses in the lower 
extremity" to proceed with surgery. Id. 
The pre-surgical examination of Mr. Wainio took place on January 18, 2010, at Dr. 
Allen's private office. R. Vol. I, p. 2004. The evaluation included an evaluation of pulses. 
Dr. Allen's note read: "pulses strong both posterior tibial and dorsalis pedis bilateral. 
Capillary refill three seconds." R. Vol. I, p. 2004. Appellants hired expert witness Albert 
Burns, D.P.M. who concluded that Dr. Allen's January 18, 2010 note indicating the 
presence of pedal pulses was ·'physically impossible." R. Vol. I, p. 2008. There is no 
evidence that Dr. Allen re-evaluated Mr. Wainio for pedal pulses on January 21, 2010. 
There was no expert ,vitness testimony suggesting that Dr. Allen was required by virtue of 
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the standard of care to re-evaluate pedal pulses on that date, that he did so, or that he did 
so negligently. Regardless, as set forth, infra, the Appellants failed to prove that Dr. Allen's 
actions or omissions were performed as an actual or apparent agent of Syringa. 
Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that Appellants' claims against Syringa 
failed as a matter of law. 
Appellants argumentatively assert that the trial court "conced[ ed] that [Syringa] 
could be vicariously liab(le] for Dr. Allen's negligent conduct in the context of his role as 
a medical staff member or owner..." Opening Brief, p. 16. Appellants' assertion is 
incorrect. Rather, the trial court concluded that "Any agency relationship that exists 
between Syringa and Dr. Allen is limited to Dr. Allen's conduct as a medical staff member 
or owner of Syringa." R. Vol. I, p. 3041. The trial court did not find that any actions taken 
by Dr. Allen in this case were undertaken on Syringa's behalf 
2. Apelian ts Failed to Generate an Issue of Fact on the Claim of Actual 
or Apparent Authority of Dr. Allen. 
Idaho Code § 6-1012 permits a plaintiff to bring an action against a healthcare 
provider or any person vicariously liable for the provider's negligence. Although the term 
'·vicarious liability" is not defined under I.C. §6-1012, it is defined generally as "liability 
that a supervisory party bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate based 
on the relationship between the two parties." Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 
147 Idaho 109,115,206 P.3d 473,479 (2009) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 934 (8th 
ed.2004)). The burden of proof was described by the Jones Court as follows: 
When a hospital is being sued in its capacity as an individual 
healthcare provider, the plaintiff is still required to prove that the 
hospital breached the applicable standard of care through expert 
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testimony. On the other hand, when a hospital is being sued in its 
capacity as the principal, the plaintiff is required to prove that the 
hospital's agent is a healthcare provider as required under the 
statute, and that the agent breached the applicable standard of care. 
Thus, the hospital is held vicariously liable for its agent's 
negligence to the same extent as if the hospital itself breached the 
standard of care under the Act. 
The burden of establishing an agency relationship is on the party asserting it. 
Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 117, 898 P.2d 43 (1995). Agency 
is a relationship resulting from "the manifestation of consent by one person to another that 
the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to 
act." Herbst v. Bothof Dairies, Inc., 110 Idaho 971, 973, 719 P.2d 1231 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 1, at 7 (1958)). "It is axiomatic that an agency 
relationship is created where one who hires another has retained a contractual right to 
control the other's manner of performance." Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 
303, 796 P.2d 506 (1990). 
An agency relationship can take three forms: express authority, implied authority, 
and apparent authority. Id at 116. The interrelated nature of the first two categories -
express and implied authority - was described in Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497-98, 
708 P.2d 900. 902-03 (1985) as follows: 
Both express and implied authority are forms of actual authority. 
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has 
explicitly granted the agent to act in the principal's name. Implied 
authority refers to that authority "which is necessary, usual, and 
proper to accomplish or perform" the express authority delegated 
to the agent by the principal. 
See Also, Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P.2d 697 (1997). 
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"Express authority may be found when there is evidence that the principal has 
explicitly granted the agent authority to act in the principal's name." Tri-Circle, Inc. v. 
Brugger Corp., 121 Idaho 950, 954, 829 P.2d 540, 544 (Ct. App. 1992). In the present case, 
it was an uncontroverted fact that Dr. Allen was not an employee of Syringa. See, R. Vol. 
L p. 2708. Dr. Allen had clinical privileges and was granted a medical staff appointment at 
Syringa. R. Vol. L p. 2871. However, pursuant to Syringa's bylaws, this simply meant that 
he was granted permission to render surgical services at the Syringa facility. R. Vol. I, p. 
2877. 
There is no evidence in the record that Dr. Allen performed the January 21, 2010 
surgery on Syringa' s behalf or in Syringa' s name. Rather, Dr. Allen simply had permission 
to use Syringa's facility for outpatient procedures. With respect to Dr. Allen's role as a 
member of the limited liability corporation, bis role was that of a member-manager, not a 
medical practitioner. R. Vol. I, p. 2711, 2860. There was no evidence that Syringa dictated 
the manner in which Dr. Allen evaluated patients, conducted pre-surgical screens, 
approved patients for surgery, or the manner in which he conducted surgery. That is, 
Syringa did not exercise control over Dr. Allen in connection with his work as a podiatrist. 
Further, the Appellants failed to provide evidence that Dr. Allen's conduct was 
pursuant to any express or implied authority granted to him by Syringa. In fact, all of the 
conduct of which the Appellants complain - approving or agreeing to perform surgery on 
Mr. Wainio despite the alleged absence of perfusion occurred prior to (January 4 and 18, 
2010) Mr. Wainio ever entering Syringa Surgical Center on January 21, 2010. 
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3. Dr. Allen Did Not Act With Apparent Authority When Treating Mr. 
\Vainio. 
Standing in contrast to actual authority is apparent authority, which exists when a 
principal voluntarily places the purported agent in such a position that a person of ordinary 
prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of a particular business, is 
justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority. Bailey v. Ness, 
109 Idaho 495, 497-98, 708 P.2d 900, 902-03 (1985). 
Apparent authority is ''created when the principal 'voluntarily places an agent in 
such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business usages and 
the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting pursuant 
to existing authority.'" Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495,497, 708 P.2d 900 (1985) (quoting 
Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278 (1972)) (emphasis in original). Apparent 
authority cannot be created by the acts and statements of the agent alone. Id. at 497-98. 
"[W]here the existence of an agency relationship is disputed - whether or not there is 
apparent authority on the agent's part to act as he acted- it is a question for the trier of fact 
to resolve from the evidence." Id. at 498 (citations omitted). However, where the facts 
presented are undisputed, a factual question may be resolved by the court as a question of 
la\V. See Borah v. lvfcCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79, 205 P.3d 1209 (2009). 
Establishing apparent authority requires proof of two elements: (1) conduct by the 
principal that would lead a person to reasonably believe that another person acts on the 
principal's behalf, i.e., conduct by the principal "holding out" that person as its agent; and 
(2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably believes it is rendered on behalf 
of the principal. Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 116, 206 
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P.3d 473 (2009). A plaintiff is also required to show a "reasonable belief that the actor 
had authority to act on behalf of the principal that is traceable to the principal's 
manifestations to the plaintiff" Id. ( emphasis added). Apparent authority does not 
presuppose the present or prior existence of an agency relationship. Id. at 113. 
The Court in Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109,480, 206 
P.3d 473 (2009), explicitly listed the elements of apparent authority in Idaho: 
( l) conduct by the principal that would lead a person to reasonably 
believe that another person acts on the principal' s behalf, i.e., 
conduct by the principal "holding out" that a person as its agent; 
and (2) acceptance of the agent's service by one who reasonably 
believes it is rendered on behalf of the principal. 
Here, the Appellants failed to establish the first element of the apparent agency test, as all 
of the acts identified by the Appellants as giving rise to such apparent agency were 
performed by Dr. Allen, the alleged agent, not Syringa, the alleged principal. Additionally, 
the location of Dr. Allen's office to Syringa is not sufficient to establish apparent agency. 
To accept such an assertion would be to hold all entities within an office building as 
apparent agents of one another simply because they share stairways. An informed consent 
form with the header of "Syringa Medical Center" is not sufficient to establish that Dr. 
Allen is S:rringa's agent as such forms are created and maintained pursuant to Idaho law. 
I.C. § 39-4508 
More importantly, there is absolutely no question that Mr. Wainio was not misled 
or confused by the arrangement. Mr. Wainio at all times intended to be treated by Dr. Allen, 
not Syringa. The Appellants attempts to establish the second element of apparent authority 
failed based upon Mr. Wainio's own sworn testimony: 
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Q: Prior to your first visit with Dr. Allen, had you ever been to 
Syringa Surgical Center? 
,A: No. 
Q: Had you ever heard of Syringa Surgical Center? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you choose to see Dr. Allen in any way, shape or form 
because of his relationship to Syringa Surgical Center? 
A: No. 
R. Vol. I, p. 2651, 2903 ( emphasis added). It is clear Mr. Wainio did not accept Dr. Allen's 
services based upon his "reasonable belief' Dr. Allen was providing his treatment on behalf 
of Syringa. Mr. Wainio did not choose Syringa. Rather, Mr. Wainio chose Dr. Allen based 
upon a referral to Dr. Allen. As such, the Appellants failed to establish the second element 
of apparent agency before the trial court. 
4. The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Appellants' Arguments 
Concerning a Theory of Independent Liability in Connection with 
Drug Monitoring. 
The February 3, 2014 Affidavit of Dr. Wischmeyer contended that Syringa was 
somehow negligent in failing to "monitor" Dr. Allen to ensure that he was "unimpaired 
and competent" and also to ensure that he was not diverting or misusing drugs. R. Vol. I, 
p. 50 I. However, the Appellants offered no evidence that Dr. Allen diverted or misused 
drugs belonging to Syringa in 2010. Further, as set forth at greater length, infi"a, there was 
no evidence in the record establishing Appellants' contention that Dr. Allen was ·'impaired 
at the time he conducted surgery on Mr. Wainio." Opening Brief, p. 28. 
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All of the factual citations concerning knowledge on the part of Syringa employees 
concerning Dr. Allen's drug use (Id.) relate to drug use prior to Dr. Allen undergoing 
extensive drug rehabilitation, and prior to Dr. Allen's treatment of Mr. Wainio. (R. Vol. I, 
p. 3017-3021). 
In addition, Dr. Wischmeyer's conclusive testimony regarding the "standard of 
care" for Syringa was unsupportable as a matter of Idaho law. Dr. Wischmeyer contended 
that Syringa was negligent in several respects. R. Vol. I, p. 1708-1709. However, Dr. 
Wischmeyer's testimony amounted to nothing more than conclusory allegations. 
There was no indication whatsoever that Dr. Wischmeyer did anything to acquaint 
himself with the local standard of care for a day-surgery center in central Idaho, or in the 
region in which Lewiston, Idaho, is located. He obviously failed to contact any local 
physicians or to inquire of the standard of care of day-surgery centers from any resource, 
and the Appellants failed to provide any evidence that such foundation information was 
unavailable. 
"The plaintiff must offer expert testimony indicating that the defendant health care 
provider negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice." Id. 
citing Dule:ney v. St. Alphonsus Regional /vfedical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d 816,820 
(2002). I.C. ~6- l O 13 requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff lay a foundation 
establishing that his or her expert witness possesses "actual knowledge of the applicable 
community standard to which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed." Daniel v. 
Inland Northwest Renal Care Group, 159 P.3d at 859. 
. . . expert testimony offered via affidavit must be made on 
personal knowledge, set forth facts that would be admissible in 
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evidence, and affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to 
testify as to the matters contained in the affidavit. 
Id. The A1cDaniels court excluded testimony of plaintiffs expert witness on affidavit 
because none of the foundational requirements of Idaho statute had been met. Therein, the 
plaintiff's expert did not demonstrate that he was familiar with the standard of care for that 
particular health care provider as it existed in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, at the time of the 
alleged negligence, nor did he even attempt to state how he became familiar with the 
standard. Dr. Wischmeyer contended that he personally would find the alleged actions of 
Syringa Surgical Center to be "reckless or grossly negligent" and yet he failed to 
demonstrate that he is familiar with the standard of care for a day-surgery center under 
similar circumstances anywhere, much less in central Idaho. 
Idaho statute very clearly requires that: 
In any case ... for damage due to injury to or death of any person, 
brought against any ... other provider of health care, including .. 
. any ... hospital ... , such claimant or plaintiff must, as an 
essential part of his or her case in chie( affirmatively prove by 
direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the confident 
evidence, that such defendant then and there negligently failed to 
meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the 
community in which such care allegedly was or should have been 
provided, as such standard existed at the time and place of the 
alleged negligence of such ... hospital ... and as such standard 
then and there existed with respect to the class of health care 
provider that such defendant then and there belonged to and in 
which capacity ... it was functioning. .. as used in this act, the 
term "community" refers to that geographical area ordinarily 
served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such 
care was or allegedly should have been provided. 
LC. §6-1012 (emphasis added). Appellants' provision of Dr. Wischmeyer's "opinions" 
regarding Syringa Surgical Center completely failed to meet the requirements of this 
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statute. With respect to Syringa, none of the Affidavits submitted by Dr. Wischmeyer, 
mentioned anything about comparable day-surgery centers in the "geographical area" 
served by any hospital in or around Lewiston, Idaho. Dr. Wischmeyer spoke in terms of 
conclusions based only upon his own personal standards. However, there was no evidence 
that Dr. Allen diverted medication from Syringa after completion of inpatient rehabilitation 
and the speculative allegations concerning his alleged relapse are addressed, infra. 
Likewise, the requisite standard of care and alleged breach is statutorily required in 
Idaho, as follows: 
The applicable standard of practice and such a defendant's failure 
to meet said standard must be established in [medical malpractice] 
cases by such a plaintiff by testimony of one ( 1) or more 
knowledgeable, competent expert witnesses, and such expert 
testimony may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation 
therefore is first laid, establishing ( a) that such an opinion is 
actually held by the expert witness, (b) that the said opinion can 
be testified to with reasonable medical certainty, and ( c) that such 
expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise 
coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable said community 
standard to which his or her expert opinion testimony is addressed; 
provided, this section shall not be construed to prohibit or 
otherwise preclude a competent witness who resides elsewhere 
from adequately familiarizing himself with the standards and 
practices of ( a particular) such area and thereafter giving opinion 
testimony in such trial. 
I. C §6-1013. Because this is a medical malpractice case, the Appellants were required to 
comply with I.C. §6-1012 and§ 6-1013. Litz v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282,283,955 P.2d 
113. 114 ( 1997). The Appellants never disclosed testimony in compliance with the medical 
negligence statute and therefore, the trial court was never faced with admissible evidence 
on this issue. Summary judgment was properly granted. 
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B. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Evidence of Dr. Allen's Drug Use and 
Speculation Concerning a "Relapse." 
The Appellants suggest that the trial court adopted a "new evidentiary standard" for 
the admissibility of evidence. Opening Brief~ p. 29. Contrary to their arguments which 
were also made before the trial court - the trial court evaluated the speculative testimony 
of drug abuse and found that such speculative, indirect evidence should be excluded under 
IRE 402, 403, and 702. 
The trial court permitted open and robust discovery concerning Dr. Allen's drug 
use. When the Appellants were unable to produce evidence that Dr. Allen had relapsed and 
was impaired \Vhen he treated Mr. Wainio, the trial court excluded evidence of the drug 
use. The trial court acted well within its discretion in doing so. However, even if the trial 
court had admitted the drug evidence, the summary judgment analysis of the claims against 
Syringa would not be altered. First, the only evidence in the record was the speculative 
testimony of Dr. Wischmeyer, who opined that Dr. Allen "could" have relapsed based upon 
his family history and his own drug history. He did not specify what type of drugs Dr. Allen 
allegedly utilized to relapse or their source (given that Dr. Allen could no longer access 
Syringa's drugs without the assistance and presence of another person). Second, Dr. 
Wischmeyer's supplemental affidavit was factually incorrect, as it claimed that Ms. 
Shatto's observations of Dr. Allen ("glittery eyes" and "jerky movements") supported the 
idea that Dr. Allen had relapsed on January 18, 2010. However, as the trial court 
recognized, Ms. Shatto was never in Dr. Allen's presence during that visit. Thus, there was 
not a scintilla of evidence before the trial court - even including the speculative testimony 
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of Dr. Wischmeyer which advanced the theory that Dr. Allen was impaired during his 
pre-surgical screen of Dr. Allen on January 18, 2010. 
1. Evidence of Drug Use Was Properly Excluded Under IRE 402-403. 
"All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or 
by other rules applicable in courts of [Idaho]. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." IRE 402. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." IRE 403. 
The trial court correctly analyzed the state of the record under IRE 403. The court 
concluded that there was no reliable evidence suggesting that Dr. Allen was using or 
abusing drugs in 2010 when he was treating Mr. Wainio, the evidence showed that Dr. 
Allen was strictly monitored for drug use during the time period in which he treated Mr. 
Wainio, and finally, even if evidence of prior drug use were relevant, such testimony was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury. R. Vol. I, p. 3034-3035. 
Courts throughout the country have been cautious when faced with allegations 
concerning prior drug or alcohol use by medical professionals in malpractice cases. 
In Sheffield v. Sheffield, 405 So.2d 1314, 1317 (Miss. 1981 ), evidence of physician's 
prior drug use excluded since "uncontradicted proof in the instant case is that Dr. Sheffield 
had not taken drugs for a month and a half prior to the baby's birth or during care 
administered while it was alive. \Ve think his previous history of drug abuse problems is 
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too remote and disconnected with the negligence issue to be properly presented to the jury 
in this case ... " relying on Standard Oil Co. v. Carter, 210 Ala. 572, 98 So. 575 (1923), 
and State v. Dault, 19 Wn.App. 709, 578 P.2d 43 (1978). 
In Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659, 661-662 (S.D. 1986), the appellate 
court held affirmed the trial court's exclusion of evidence that the treating physician was 
an alcoholic since the record did not include evidence "that alcohol had any effect on 
diagnosis, treatment, preoperative or postoperative care," citing Mydlarz v. Palmeri 
Duncan Const Co., 682 P.2d 695, 704 (Mont. 1984). In Mydlarz the Montana Supreme 
Court held that a jury could be mislead even by the mention that the defendant was an 
alcoholic, regardless of the defendant's condition at the time of the incident. Substituting 
defendant Behrens' name for that of the defendant in Mydlarz, the South Dakota court 
quoted ivfydlarz as follows: 
Evidence that [Behrens] might have been an alcoholic when the 
accident occurred may have some probative value regarding the 
cause of the accident. However, the indirect relevance of this 
evidence requires us to find that the probative value of the 
evidence is clearly outweighed by the prejudicial effect on 
lBehrens]. We find that the jury could have been mislead by 
evidence indicating [Behrens] was an alcoholic and erroneously 
presume the accident was caused by such disease. 
A1ydlarz v. Palmeri Duncan Const. Co., 682 P.2d at 704. In this case Dr. Allen was 
discharged from rehabilitation months before he treated Mr. Wainio. The fact that he was 
once a drug user is highly inflammatory as opposed to any relevance that such evidence 
may have. The introduction of Dr. Allen's history of drug use would most certainly 
"mislead lthe jury] by evidence indicating [Dr. Allen] was an [a drug addictJ and 
erroneously presume the accident was caused by such disease." 
In Ornelas v. Fry. 151 Ariz. 324, 727 P.2d 819 (Ariz.App. 1986), the court excluded 
evidence of defendant physician's "alcoholism" since the plaintiffs failed to produce 
evidence that the alcoholism affected the physician's ability to comply with the applicable 
standard of care at the time of treatment. Plaintiffs had submitted two "expert" affidavits 
that concluded that the physician was "impaired" on the date of the surgery at issue, but the 
court rejected that argument: 
He hold as a matter of law that the fact Dr. Fry may have been an 
alcoholic at the time of the surgery on Robert Ornelas does not 
create in and of itself a separate issue or claim of negligence. It is 
only when that alcoholism translates into conduct falling below 
the applicable standard of care that it has any relevance. Here, 
appellants were unable to furnish any evidence that at the time of 
the alleged malpractice, Dr. Fry's performance was in any manner 
impaired because of the use of alcohol. Thus, it was not error for 
the trial court to deny the pre-trial motions to amend the complaint 
and/or to reconvene the medical liability review panel. 
Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d at 823. 
In Shea v. Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130, 137 (Minn.App. 2001), evidence that a 
physician had previously been professionally disciplined for writing prescriptions for 
himself and for asking his colleagues to do so as well was excluded from trial since it 
served no relevant purpose and was "very prejudicial." In Perryman v. DeKalb County 
Hospital Authority, I 97 Ga.App. 505, 398 S.E.2d 745 (1990), the court excluded evidence 
of "rumors" of physician's drug use as irrelevant to the issue of whether the physician was 
competent to perform a certain procedure. In Yost v. Bermudez, 2003 WL 22941223 (Ohio 
App. 2003), the court excluded evidence of a physician's involvement in a bar fight and 
arrest for driving while intoxicated as irrelevant to medical malpractice claim. 
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Other courts have noted that the purpose of rules regarding relevance and prejudice 
are designed to prevent evidence "of scant ... probative force, dragged in by its heels for 
the sake of its prejudicial effect." United States v. A1cRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 
1979). Such is precisely the case here. 
2. Dr. Wischmeyer's Opinions Were Properly Excluded. 
Dr. Wischmeyer submitted an Affidavit dated October 19, 2012 in which he offered 
the following opinion concerning relapse: 
Given Dr. Allen's long term significant substance abuse of opiates 
and Propofol, the inadequate amount of treatment time (60 days 
instead of a more common length of stay for medical professionals 
of 90 days), the failure of appropriate drug testing at the time of 
admission to rehabilitation, the return to work one day after Dr. 
Allen's discharge from rehabilitation (which was likely 
inappropriate given Dr. Allen's long-standing IV drug/opiate 
abuse) in conjunction with his family history of substance abuse 
and concomitant psychological diagnosis of depression, and 
finally, the apparent inability to appreciate the absence of pedal 
pulses ... it is my opinion on a more probable than not basis that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that Dr. Allen could have 
relapsed in use of either opiates or Propofol, which would of 
impaired his perception and/or ability to appropriately care for and 
evaluate Mr. Wainio. 
R. Vol. I, p. 1157-1558 (emphasis added). 
Dr. Wischmeyer submitted another Affidavit dated February 3, 2014. Dr. 
Wischmeyer testified that Ms. Shatto's Affidavit describing "glittery eyes" and "jerky 
movements'' along with Dr. Allen's previous drug abuse and family history demonstrated 
that Dr. Allen ''relapsed and was under the influence of drugs at the time of his preoperative 
evaluation of Mr. Wainio on January 18, 2010." R. Vol. I, p. 1711. As the trial court 
correctly recognized, Dr. Wischmeyer's Affidavit was factually incorrect. Ms. Shatto was 
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not present at the January 18,2010 pre-surgical visit. R. Vol., I, p. 2257. While Ms. Shatto's 
Affidavit claimed that she attended "the" pre-surgical visit, she testified in her deposition 
that the on(v time she was in the presence of Dr. Allen was on the January 4, 2010 visit. 
Id. at p. 2257, FN 2. Dr. Wischmeyer's Affidavit made no mention of intoxication, relapse, 
or impairment on either January 4, 2010 or January 21, 2010. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony proffered in 
his October 19, 2012 Affidavit was "triple-qualified." R. Vol. I, p. 3034. Dr. Wischmeyer's 
opinion was not offered on a more probable than not basis, but rather, it was probable that 
there was a likelihood that Dr. Allen could have relapsed. Id. 
With respect to Dr. Wischmeyer's February 3, 2014 Affidavit, the trial court 
properly exercised its gatekeeping function in excluding such testimony where it was 
improperly based upon speculation and conjecture. "[E]xpert opinion which is speculative, 
conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in 
rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46-47, 
844 P.2d 24 (1992). Testimony is speculative when it "theoriz[es] about a matter as to 
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 
565, 97 P.3d 428,432 (2004). Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony is clearly a "theory" concerning 
a matter upon which there is no direct evidence. 
3. Dr. \Vishmeyer's Testimonv \Vould Not Create a Question of Fact as 
to Syringa. 
As set forth above, Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony, even if admitted, would not create 
a genuine issue of material fact precluding Syringa's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
There remains no evidence in the record that Dr. Allen was impaired on the date that he 
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performed surgery on Mr. Wainio at Syringa Surgical Center (January 21, 2010). Even if 
there had been, the Appellants failed to prove that Dr. Allen was acting as an agent of 
Syringa on that date. With respect to the pre-surgical visits, Dr. Wischmeyer's testimony 
was clearly erroneous. There was no observation or testimony suggesting that Dr. Allen 
was impaired on January 18, 2010, the date he documented finding pulses in Mr. Wainio's 
right lower extremity. Rather, Dr. Wischmeyer erroneously concluded that Ms. Shatto 
observed "glittery eyes" and "jerky movements" of Dr. Allen on that date, but the trial 
court correctly recognized that those late-arriving observations were made on January 4, 
2010, not January 18, 2010. As such, Dr. Wischmeyer' s testimony was deeply flawed. The 
prejudicial effect of such testimony substantially outweighed any possible probative value, 
and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the same. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Syringa respectfully asks this Court to affirm the trial court's Opinion and Order 
on Syringa Surgical Center's Motion for Summary Judgment dated November 26, 2014 
(R. Vol. L p. 3037-3041) and its Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Re 
Drug use and Motion for Permissive Appeal dated November 19, 2014 (R. Vol. I, p. 3030-
3035). 
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